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*

The public trust doctrine has been attacked by libertarian
1
property rights advocates for being grounded on shaky history,
2
3
inefficient, a threat to private property, and inconsistent with

*

Professor of Law, Lewis and Clark Law School. I thank Eric Freyfogel for
comments on a draft of this paper, Mary Wood for the inspiration, Elizabeth
Dawson, 2L, Lewis and Clark Law School, for help with the footnotes, and the
Lewis and Clark summer research program for support.
1. See James L. Huffman, Speaking of Inconvenient Truths: A History of
the Public Trust Doctrine, 18 DUKE ENVTL. L & POL’Y F. 1 (2007) (alleging that
the public trust doctrine’s roots in Roman and English law are mythical, at least
to the extent of preserving public rights; that American public trust law is
grounded on a cases later overruled or misguided; and, that although the
doctrine’s evolution in the 19th century from tidal to navigable-in-fact waters
was permissible, its 20th century evolution into a vehicle for resource
preservation is a dangerous threat to both property rights and democracy). See
infra note 13.
2. Jedidiah Brewer & Gary D. Libecap, Property Rights and the Public

Trust Doctrine in Environmental Protection and Natural Resource
Conservation, 53 AUSTL. J. AGRIC. & RESOURCE ECON. 1 (2009) (claiming that
the public trust doctrine is less efficient than alternative allocation approaches
like marketplace transactions or condemnation because it produces
uncompensated redistribution, encourages litigation, and undermines
settlements).
3. Randy T. Simmons, Property and the Public Trust Doctrine, in 39 PROP.
& ENV’T. RES. CENTER POL’Y SERIES 1 (2007) (charging that the public trust
doctrine equips judges and legislatures with the power to reduce property rights
to the whims of changing public perceptions); George P. Smith & Michael
Sweeney, The Public Trust Doctrine and Natural Law: Emanations Within a
Penumbra, 33 B.C. ENVTL AFF. L. REV. 307, 333 (2006) (claiming that private
property rights are compromised or eliminated if unprotected by constitutional
compensation).
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the rule of law. Some libertarians see application of the public
5
trust doctrine as an evisceration of private property rights. In
reality, such claims are hyperbolic.
The doctrine actually
functions to mediate between public and private rights, and thus
is hardly the antithesis of private property; instead, it functions
to transform, not eradicate, private property rights.
This mediating function was well described over a quartercentury ago by the California Supreme Court in its famous Mono
Lake decision as an effort to accommodate both private property
and public concerns through continuous state supervision of trust
resources, regardless of whether they were in public or private
6
ownership. Courts applying the Mono Lake doctrine demand all
7
feasible accommodations to preserve and protect trust assets, but
4. James L. Huffman, Background Principles and the Rule of Law, 35
ECOLOGY L.Q. 1, 27 (2008) (maintaining that employing background property
principles like the public trust doctrine as a defense to takings claims is
inconsistent with the rule of law because it is a distortion of the common law
process to suggest that state courts and legislatures can modify or abandon
established common law principles in the name of present day notions of the
public interest and public rights).
5. See Simmons, supra note 3, at 13 (charging that the effect of the public
trust doctrine on private property eliminates the fundamental right to exclude,
and without that right, property devolves back to the open-access commons from
which it emerged, leading to inevitable overuse and environmental destruction).
6. Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v. Super. Ct. of Alpine County, 658 P.2d 709, 712,
723 (Cal. 1983) [hereinafter Mono Lake] (noting that “the core of the public trust
doctrine is the state’s authority as sovereign to exercise a continuous
supervision and control over the navigable waters of the state and the lands
underlying those waters.” Previous case law demonstrates the continuing power
of the state as administrator of the trust, a power which extends to revocation of
previously granted rights or to the enforcement of the trust against lands long
thought free of the trust.)
7. See id. at 712, 728 (affirming the authority of the state to grant nonvested usufructuary rights to appropriate water even if the diversions harm
public trust uses but requiring courts and agencies approving such diversions to
consider the effect of the diversions on trust uses and attempt, so far as feasible,
to avoid or minimize any harm to those interests. “The state has an affirmative
duty to take the public trust into account in the planning and allocation of water
resources, and to protect public trust uses wherever feasible.”); see also Ctr. for
Biological Diversity, Inc. v. FPL Group, Inc., 83 Cal. Rptr. 3d 588, 601 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2008) (recognizing that members of the public have the right to question
agencies’ decisions because they do not always strike an appropriate balance
between protecting trust resources and accommodating other legitimate public
interests); In re Water Use Permit Applications, 93 P.3d 643, 658 (Haw. 2004)
[hereinafter Waiahole Ditch II] (vacating Water Commission’s decision
regarding allocation of water resources in part for failure to require the parties
to justify the proposed water use in light of the trust purposes and weigh
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they do not attempt to eliminate private property. In fact,
virtually all applications of the public trust doctrine leave
8
possession of private property unchanged.
The doctrine does, however, often alter development rights,
9
but those rights are only one stick in the property bundle.
Equating diminished development rights with a loss of all private
property rights is a categorical mistake, one that perhaps serves
the libertarian project of erecting the just compensation clause of
the Fifth Amendment as a bulwark against continued efforts to
10
modernize property law, but it also overlooks the many
11
dimensions of property rights and obligations.
competing public and private water uses on a case-by-case basis); In re Water
Use Permit Applications, 9 P.3d 409, 452, 454 (Haw. 2000) [hereinafter
Waiahole Ditch I] (citing Mono Lake as instructive while positing that Hawaii’s
public trust doctrine may require even more protections than California’s, but
still indicating a preference for accommodating both instream and offstream
uses where feasible); Raleigh Ave. Beach Ass’n v. Atlantis Beach Club, Inc., 879
A.2d 112, 121 (N.J. 2005) (requiring upland private owner to provide public
access to the water even though public use of the upland sands is subject to an
accommodation of the interests of the owner).
8. See infra notes 35-73 and accompanying text.
9. See Myrl L. Duncan, Reconceiving the Bundle of Sticks: Land as a
Community-Based Resource, 32 ENVTL. L. 773 (2002) (examining and finding
wanting the traditional property bundle of sticks that is taught in law school
and arguing for an expanded bundle that includes community obligations).
10. The leading commentary on the use of the Fifth Amendment as a
limitation on land use and environmental regulation is RICHARD EPSTEIN,
TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN (1985).
11. See, e.g., Duncan, Reconceiving the Bundle of Sticks, supra note 9; ERIC
T. FREYFOGEL, ON PRIVATE PROPERTY: FINDING COMMON GROUND ON THE
OWNERSHIP OF LAND 1-28, 84-104 (2007) (emphasizing that land ownership
entails public responsibilities in an interconnected and ever-changing world)
[hereinafter FREYFOGEL, ON PRIVATE PROPERTY]. See also ERIC T. FREYFOGEL,
THE LAND WE SHARE: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE COMMON GOOD 101-34 (2003)
[hereinafter FREYFOGEL, THE LAND WE SHARE]. On the multi-dimensional nature
of property, see, e.g., Eduardo M. Peñalver, Land Virtues, 94 CORNELL L. REV.
821, 870 (2009) (describing the need to strike the right balance between our
obligations toward others and our inclination to favor our own interests when
lawmakers make land use decisions); Joseph William Singer, The Ownership
Society and Takings of Property: Castles, Investments and Just Obligations, 30
HARV. L. REV. 309, 314, 328-38 (2006) (arguing that the Supreme Court in
Lingle v. Chevron, U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528 (2005), returned to a citizenship
model of property that presumes part of what it means to be a member of society
is that owners have obligations as well as rights); Myrl L. Duncan, Property as a

Public Conversation, Not a Lockean Soliloquy: A Role for Intellectual and Legal
History in Takings Analysis, 26 ENVTL. L. 1095, 1108 (1996) (emphasizing that
the pre-Lockean medieval world generally conceived property ownership as
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The public trust doctrine has a special role to play in
moderating development rights because it is, as suggested by
Justice Scalia’s majority opinion in Lucas v. South Carolina
12
Coastal Commission, a background principle of property law.
13
Given the antiquity of the doctrine, the public trust is well
suited to its role as a background principle. A number of postLucas decisions have confirmed Justice Scalia’s insight that the
public trust serves to limit property owners’ reasonable
expectations to such an extent that loss of their development
14
rights does not give rise to constitutional compensation. In fact,
the trust doctrine as a background principle has had a

limited by social obligations and that individual control was in the nature of a
social trust); John E. Cribbet, Concepts in Transition: The Search for a New
Definition of Property, 1986 U. ILL. L. REV. 1 (1986); Jeremy Waldron, What Is
Private Property?, 5 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 313 (1985); Joseph L. Sax,
Thoughts on the Decline of Private Property, 58 WASH. L. REV. 481 (1983);
Thomas C. Grey, The Disintegration of Property, in Nomos XXII 69 (J. Roland
Pennock & John W. Chapman, eds., 1980); Francis S. Philbrick, Changing
Conceptions in Property Law, 86 U. PA. L. REV. 691 (1938); P.J. PROUDHON,
WHAT IS PROPERTY: AN INQUIRY INTO THE PRINCIPLE OF RIGHT AND OF
GOVERNMENT (Benj. R. Tucker trans., 1876).
12. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1029 (1992) (suggesting
that uncompensated regulations that prohibit all economically beneficial use of
land must inhere in the title itself, in the restrictions that background principles
of the State’s law of property and nuisance already place upon land ownership);
See also id. at 1031 (stating that the state of South Carolina, “if it sought to
restrain Lucas in a common-law action for public nuisance . . . must identify
background principles of nuisance and property law that prohibit the uses he
now intends in the circumstances in which the property is presently found.”)
13. See Harrison C. Dunning, The Antiquity of the Public Right, in 2
WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, ch. 29 (Robert E. Beck & Amy K. Kelley, eds., 3rd
ed. 2009). Professor Huffman’s claim that the public trust doctrine is historically
illegitimate, James L, Huffman, Speaking of Inconvenient Truths: A History of
the Public Trust Doctrine, 18 DUKE ENVTL. L & POL’Y F. 1 (2007), largely
retraced ground trod in two secondary sources: Patrick Devaney, Title, Jus
Publicum, and the Public Trust: An Historical Analysis, 1 SEA GRANT L.J. 13
(1976); and Glen MacGrady, The Navigability Concept in Civil and Common

Law: Historical Development, Current Importance, and Some Doctrines that
Don’t Hold Water, 3 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 511 (1975). No original historical
research was evident in Huffman’s article.
14. Palazzolo v. State, No. 88-0297, 2005 R.I. Super. LEXIS 108 at *55-56
(R.I. Super. Ct. July 5, 2005) (holding that the public trust doctrine can block a
tidelands development without compensation); McQueen v. S.C. Coastal
Council, 580 S.E.2d 116 (S.C. 2003) (same, except that the tidelands were
artificially created). See Erin Ryan, Palazzolo, The Public Trust, and the

Property Owner’s Reasonable Expectations: Takings and the South Carolina
Marsh Island Bridge Debate, 15 SE. ENVTL. L.J. 121 (2006).
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considerably larger effect on regulatory takings jurisprudence
than the Lucas holding that regulations causing complete
15
economic wipeouts are categorical takings.
This result has been disturbing to some libertarian property
advocates because they assume that the public trust doctrine is
the antithesis of property rights, an assumption that dovetails
with their fixation on the just compensation clause as the sine
qua non of property. But property rights also include the rights
16
of possession, use, and alienation and are limited by the non17
injury rule to neighbors and the community. So, a loss of the
right to constitutional compensation would hardly produce a
complete loss of all property rights. Thus, even where it functions
to deny landowner compensation claims, the operation of the
public trust doctrine should not be viewed as the equivalent of a
permanent physical occupation of property, which is a categorical
18
taking.
15. See Michael C. Blumm & Lucas Ritchie, Lucas’s Unlikely Legacy: The
Rise of Background Principles as Categorical Takings Defenses, 29 HARV.
ENVTL. L. REV. 321, 367 (2005) (maintaining that the categorical takings rule
articulated in Lucas has turn[ed] out to be “much less significant than the
categorical defenses the decision authorized.”)
16. See generally A.M. Honore, Ownership, in OXFORD ESSAYS IN
JURISPRUDENCE 107, 112-24 (1961) (discussing incidents of land ownership,
including rights to possession, use, management, income, capital, security, and
alienation).
17. The classic statement about the limits on private property comes from
Chief Justice Lemuel Shaw of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court in
1851: “All property in this commonwealth . . . is derived directly or indirectly
from the government, and held subject to those general regulations, which are
necessary to the common good and general welfare.” Commonwealth v. Alger, 61
Mass. (7 Cush.) 53, 85 (1851). See also id. at 84-85.
We think it is a settled principle, growing out of the nature of a well
ordered civil society, that every holder of property, however absolute and
unqualified may be his title, holds it under the implied liability that his
use of it may be so regulated that it shall not be injurious to the equal
enjoyment of others having an equal right to the enjoyment of their
property, nor injurious to the rights of the community. . . ”.

Id.
18. See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419
(1982) (involving cable television wires and boxes, causing $1.00 in damage).
Several recent decisions by the Court of Federal Claims and the Federal Circuit
have considered federal restrictions on state water rights to protect endangered
fish populations to amount to physical occupations, but in none of these cases
did the courts consider the limitations the California public trust doctrine places
on water rights in the state. See Tulare Lake Water Basin Storage Comm. v.
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This article shows how the public trust doctrine functions
alongside private property by examining representative case law
in various states, which reveals a vibrant federalism in terms of
how the background principle of the public trust doctrine affects
19
private rights. Part I begins with an examination of case law,
beginning in 1821 with the seminal case of Arnold v. Mundy, in
which the New Jersey Supreme Court began to establish a lineal
definition of the public trust doctrine by delineating between
public and private rights in submerged lands according to tidal
influence. In the nineteenth century, this idea was quickly
extended to all waterways that are navigable-in-fact. Part II
moves beyond these lineal definition cases to those that adopt a
more conceptual division between public and private rights
through distinguishing between jus public and jus privatum,
which allows trust duties to be imposed on private landowners
without displacing their fee simple titles. Part III looks at
another feature of the coexistence of public and private rights by
examining those cases, beginning with the lodestar U.S. Supreme
Court decision of Illinois Central Railroad v. Illinois, which
establish exceptions allowing small privatization of public trust
resources.
Part IV turns to decisions that preserve trust
resources by interpreting the application of the trust to transform
a landowner’s fee simple absolute into a defeasible fee. Finally,
Part V explains those decisions, epitomized by beach access cases,
which recognize the trust doctrine and the related doctrine of

United States, 49 Fed. Cl. 313 (2001) (deciding that federal restrictions on water
diversions that reduced water deliveries to irrigators called for in federal
contracts was a physical occupation, apparently overlooking Mono Lake’s
disclaimer of any vested water rights under California law); Casitas Municipal
Water Dist. v. United States, 543 F.3d 1276 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (concluding that
federal restrictions requiring a water district to channel water through a fish
ladder could be a physical occupation taking, in part because the court thought,
as a federal court, it could not interpret the effect of the state’s public trust
doctrine on the state water right); Stockton East Water Dist. v. United States,
583 F.3d 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (allowing a takings claim to proceed concerning
federal restrictions that reduced federal water deliveries as called for in federal
contracts without considering the effect of the public trust doctrine).
19. One recent critique of the background principles concept managed to
avoid almost any discussion of recent case law on background principles. See
James L. Huffman, Background Principles and the Rule of Law, 35 ECOLOGY
L.Q. 1 (2008) (alleging that the use of background principles as takings defenses
distorts Justice Scalia’s meaning in his Lucas decision and disregards the Fifth
Amendment’s takings clause).
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customary rights to superimpose a public easement on private
land titles. This examination of public trust case law shows that
the public trust doctrine has had a transformative effect on
private property rights, but it has not functioned, as is sometimes
20
alleged, to eliminate private property.
Actually, the doctrine
serves as a prime example of the common law’s ability to evolve to
21
meet the felt necessities of the times.
I.

THE TRUST DOCTRINE AS A LINEAL DIVISION
BETWEEN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE RIGHTS

The American public trust doctrine, inherited from England,
was first recognized by Chief Justice Andrew Kirkpatrick of the
New Jersey Supreme Court in Arnold v. Mundy, a test case in
which Arnold, a riparian landowner who had planted oysters in a
tidal reach of the Raritan River, claimed that Mundy, who
22
harvested the oysters, trespassed in doing so. In a decision that
the U.S. Supreme Court later described as “entitled to great

20. See Simmons, supra note 3, at 13, 17.
21. See OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 1 (Dover Publications
1991) (1881).
The life of the law has not been logic: it has been experience. The felt
necessities of the time, the prevalent moral and political theories,
intuitions of public policy, avowed or unconscious, even the prejudices
which judges share with their fellow-men, have had a good deal more to
do than the syllogism in determining the rules by which men should be
governed.

Id. Eric Freyfogle has traced some of the most significant shifts in the common
law of property, noting especially the major shifts resulting from
industrialization and westward expansion. FREYFOGEL, THE LAND WE SHARE,
supra note 11, at 37-99. He also explained the massive shift that occurred in
trespass during the antebellum era, when courts and legislatures curtailed the
public’s right to use unenclosed land. FREYFOGEL, ON PRIVATE PROPERTY, supra
note 11, at 29-60. See also Eric T. Freyfogel, Property and Liberty, 34 HARV.
ENVTL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2010) (arguing that lawmakers are morally
obligated to revise property laws over time so that the law enforces only
property rights that foster the common good, attacking the notion of a natural
law of property which he claims is a product of majoritarian law).
22. Arnold v. Mundy, 6 N.J.L. 1, 8, 32 (1821). In 1821, Chief Justice
Kirkpatrick was in his twenty-third year as a member of the New Jersey
Supreme Court and his seventeenth year as Chief Justice.
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weight” and the product of “great deliberation and research,” the
court ruled that Mundy had no title to the submerged land in
question because the sovereign owned the beds of tidal waters in
24
New Jersey, just as it did in England.
Arnold v. Mundy began a lineal division of public and private
submerged lands according to a waterbody’s physical
25
characteristics.
Arnold declared tidal submerged lands to be
public, but well before the end of the Nineteenth Century, other
state courts expanded public submerged lands to include waters
26
that were navigable-in-fact.
The U.S. Supreme Court quickly
27
ratified this result, a considerable expansion in scope that
brought the concept of state sovereign ownership to vast inland
28
waterways.

23. Martin v. Waddell’s Lessee, 41 U.S. 367, 418 (1842) (approving the
rationale of Arnold and suggesting that the rule that the states owned the beds
of tidal waters applied to all original states as successors to the English Crown).
24. Arnold, 6 N.J.L. at 50.
25. In Pollard v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212 (1845), the Supreme Court
expanded Martin’s recognition of state ownership of submerged tidal lands
beyond the original thirteen states as successors to the English Crown to all
subsequent states, ruling that the federal government held tidal submerged
lands in trust for future states prior to statehood.
26. See, e.g, Carson v. Blazer, 2 Binn. 475 (Pa. 1810) (concluding that it
would be “highly unreasonable” to limit the scope of navigability to tidal
waters); McManus v. Carmichael, 3 Iowa 1, 18, 30 (1856) (recognizing
navigability-in-fact, not the presence of the tide, as the defining characteristic of
public waters when determining landowner’s title for riparian parcel to extend
only to the high water mark); Home v. Richards, 8 Va. (4 Call) 441 (1798)
(concluding that the beds of navigable rivers belong to the commonwealth and
as such cannot be conveyed); Town of Ravenswood v. Flemings, 22 W.Va. 52
(1883) (acknowledging the navigable-in-fact test as controlling when limiting the
title of riparian owners along the Ohio River to the high water mark and
declaring the bed as vested in the state); Ingraham v. Wilkinson, 21 Mass (4
Pick.) 268, 284 (1826) (stating the common law to be that navigable waters
“invariably and exclusively belong to the public” while not directly deciding the
issue because no navigable river was in dispute).
27. The Genesee Chief v. Fitzhugh, 53 U.S. 443 (1851) (upholding a
congressional extension of admiralty jurisdiction to nontidal waters used for
commerce); Barney v. City of Keokuk, 94 U.S. 324, 338 (1876) (rejecting the
distinction between tidal and non tidal waters for the purposes of navigability
and sovereign ownership, but leaving to the states the ultimate disposition of
their submerged lands).
28. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 484 U.S. 489, 484-85 (1988)
(confirming that lands beneath both tidal and navigable-in-fact waters were
state-owned public trust lands).
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The upshot of Arnold and its progeny was a lineal division of
public and private rights. The beds of waters influenced by the
tides or that are navigable-in-fact were state-owned in trust for
the public, while lands submerged beneath non tidal, nonnavigable waters could be privately owned. Sovereign lands and
private lands existed side-by-side, with the lands critically
important for navigation and fishing in public hands.
Many states adhere to the lineal delineation of public versus
29
private ownership described above.
However, judicial
interpretation of navigability has proved malleable, as many
courts now consider any waters suitable for recreation to meet
the navigability test, regardless of whether they ever supported
30
traditional commercial enterprises.
Moreover, in some states
the definition of navigable waters is elastic in order to account for
31
changes due to human interventions like dams and levees. In
some states, courts have extended the public trust doctrine
beyond navigable and tidal waters to include non-navigable
32
33
34
waters, groundwater, and parklands.
Thus, there is no
29. For states recognizing navigability as controlling, see supra note 26 and
accompanying text; see also State v. Slotness, 185 N.W.2d 530, 532 (Minn. 1971)
(noting that “the state owns the bed of navigable waters below the low-water
mark in trust for the people.”) For states adhering to the tidal test see Hooker v.
Cummings, 20 Johns. 90 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1822) (recognizing non tidal rivers as
private, even if still subject to public use); Brown v. Chadbourne, 31 Me. 9
(1849) (maintaining the common law doctrine that riparian owners along
freshwater rivers own to the middle thread of the stream, and distinguishing
freshwater bed ownership from tidal bed ownership, which remains in the
state).
30. See, e.g., Mont. Coal. for Stream Access v. Curran, 682 P.2d 163, 171
(Mont. 1984); State v. McIlroy, 595 S.W.2d 659 (Ark. 1980); Parks v. Cooper, 676
N.W.2d 823 (S.D. 2004). See generally Dunning, supra note 13, § 32.03(a), at 328 (noting that at least ten states have adopted the “pleasure boat” test for
navigability).
31. See, e.g., Ark. River Rights Comm. v. Echubby Lake Hunting Club, 126
S.W.3d 738 (Ark. 2003) (ruling that the public gained recreational access rights
when a dam permanently flooded riparian lands); McQueen v. S.C. Coastal
Council, 580 S.E.2d 116, 119-20 (S.C. 2003) (holding that the public trust
doctrine extended to waters in man-made canals and their extension by erosion).
32. See, e.g., Mono Lake, 658 P.2d at 712, 727-30 (Cal. 1983) (public trust
extends to non-navigable waters that affect navigable waters); Parks v. Cooper,
676 N.W.2d 823 (S.D. 2004) (all water in the state is owned by the public and
managed by the state under the public trust doctrine).
33. See Waiahole Ditch I, 9 P.3d at 409 (groundwater); 10 VT. STAT. ANN.
tit. 10, § 1390(5) (2010) (it is the policy of the state that the groundwater
resources of the state are held in trust for the public); Great Lakes St Lawrence
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uniform interpretation of this lineal, geographic division between
public and private rights, and there seems to be an evolution
toward a more expansive delineation on the public side of the
divide.
II. THE TRUST DOCTRINE AS A CONCEPTIONAL
DIVISION BETWEEN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE
RIGHTS
The lineal definition of the scope of the public trust doctrine
is in some jurisdictions complemented by a more abstract
division: where the doctrine applies, it works a kind of
conceptional severance into jus publicum and jus privatum
35
estates. A leading example is the California Supreme Court’s
1971 decision in Marks v. Whitney, where the court rejected an
attempt by a landowner to fill tidelands over the objection of a
36
neighbor.
According to Marks, the effect of the public trust
doctrine’s application to wetlands was to divide the landowners
37
property into two different estates, similar to what occurs in the

River Basin Compact, Pub. L. No. 110-342, 122 Stat. 3739 (2008); id. § 1.2
(defining regulated basin water to include groundwater); id. § 1.3(1)(a)
(declaring basin waters to be precious public resources shared and held in trust
by the states; id. § 1.3(1)(f) (instructing compact states to protect, restore,
improve, and manage to renewable but finite waters of the basin for the use,
benefit, and enjoyment of all their citizens, including generations yet to come).
See also Bridgett Donegan, The Great Lakes Compact and the Public Trust
Doctrine: Beyond Michigan and Wisconsin Common Law, 24 J. ENVTL. L &
LITIG. 455 (2009).
34. See, e.g., Paepcke v. Pub. Bldg. Comm’n, 263 N.E.2d 11, 15 (Ill. 1970);
Friends of Van Cortland Park v. New York, 750 N.E.2d 1050, 1053 (N.Y. 2001).
35. See Dictionary.com, jus publicum, http://dictionary.reference.com
/browse/jus+publicum (last visited Aug. 18, 2010) (according to one account, is a
right of public ownership; specifically, the right of ownership of real property
that is held in trust by the government for the public); see also Dictionary.com,
jus privatum, http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/jus+privatum?qsrc=2446
(last visited Aug. 18, 2010) (a right of private ownership).
36. Marks v. Whitney, 491 P.2d 374, 380, 381 (Cal. 1971) (Marks was a
notable public trust decision because it recognized public standing to enforce
trust obligations, and described the public trust as a flexible doctrine able to
evolve to accommodate changing public needs, such as preservation of wetlands
in their natural state).
37. See id. (distinguishing the landowner’s jus privatum from the jus
publicum of the people).
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38

case of financial trust. The landowner’s recognized jus privatum
recognized rights such as possession and alienation, but that
estate was burdened by the public’s jus publicum rights, which
restrained private development that was inconsistent with public
39
rights.
A number of state courts have employed Marks v. Whitney’s
recognition that the public trust doctrine’s effect is to sever
property into two distinct estates. For example, the New York
Supreme Court relied upon the jus publicum/jus privatum
distinction to order a landowner to remove a fill he placed in
40
Manhasset Bay. The South Carolina Supreme Court used the
same conceptual severance to deny a takings claim concerning a
denial of a fill permit for artificially created submerged lands in
41
Myrtle Beach.
And the Michigan Supreme Court invoked the
jus publicum/privatum dichotomy in ruling that the public trust
doctrine gave the public access rights on privately owned lands
42
along the Great Lakes below the mean high water mark.

38. When money or land is held in a traditional trust, the trustee has legal
title to the property, while the beneficiaries have equitable title. See generally
AMERICAN LAW INST., RESTATEMENT OF TRUSTS (THIRD) (1992). The property is
thus conceptually severed into two estates, and the trustee has judicially
enforceable obligations to the beneficiaries.
39. See Marks, 491 P.2d at 380-81.
The power of the state to control, regulate and utilize its navigable
waterways and the lands lying beneath them, when acting within the
terms of the trust, is absolute . . . it is within the province of the trier of
fact to determine whether any particular use made or asserted by
Whitney in or over these tidelands would constitute an infringement
either upon the jus privatum of Marks or upon the jus publicum of the
people. It is also within the province of the trier of fact to determine
whether any particular use to which Marks wishes to devote his
tidelands constitutes an unlawful infringement upon the jus publicum
therein.

Id.
40. Arnolds Inn, Inc. v. Morgan, 310 N.Y.S 2d 541, 547 (Sup. Ct. 1970).
41. McQueen v. S.C. Coastal Council, 580 S.E.2d 116, 119 (S.C. 2003).
42. Glass v. Goeckel, 703 N.W.2d 58, 65 (Mich. 2005).
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III. THE TRUST DOCTRINE’S EXCEPTIONS
ALLOWING PRIVATIZATION OF SOME TRUST
RESOURCES
The signature American public trust doctrine case is Illinois
Central Railroad v. Illinois, an 1892 decision of the Supreme
Court, in which Justice Stephen Field authored a majority
opinion for the Court that held that the state could not privatize
most of the Chicago harbor without violating the public trust
43
doctrine. This decision has probably energized the libertarians
against the public trust doctrine because the Court used the
doctrine to justify a preference for public ownership over
44
private.
But Justice Field’s decision also authorized
privatization of trust resources when 1) the conveyance furthered
public purposes, and 2) there was no substantial effect on
45
remaining trust resources. The effect of these exceptions was to

43. Ill. Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 452, 460, 465 (1892) (Shiras, J.,
dissenting). Although the Supreme Court split 4-3 on the case (with Chief
Justice Fuller and Justice Blatchford recusing themselves), all seven justices
believed that the public trust doctrine applied to the state’s conveyance of the
submerged lands to the railroad. But the three dissenters believed that the state
possessed sufficient regulatory authority to ensure that the public’s rights could
be protected despite the conveyance. See Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas Merrill,

The Origins of the American Public Trust Doctrine: What Really Happened in
Illinois Central, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 709 (2004) (a thorough discussion of the
background and outcome of the case, explaining that the railroad’s motivations
in lobbying for the statute granting the submerged lands was to fend off
competitors, including one rival headed by Melvin Fuller before he became Chief
Justice; that the state of Illinois had neither the financial resources nor
expertise to develop the Chicago Harbor; that downstate legislators favored the
grant to the railroad because a state 7% gross receipts tax would have generated
money to fund downstate projects; and, that railroad probably engaged in
bribery in securing passage of the legislation).
44. Illinois Central, 146 U.S. at 453.
The state can no more abdicate its trust over property in which the whole
people are interested, like navigable waters and soils underneath them,
so as to leave them entirely under the use or control of private parties . . .
than it can abdicate its police powers in the administration of
government and the preservation of the peace.

Id.
45. Id. (approving trust dispositions to private parties in the instance of
parcels, for the improvement of navigation and use of the waters, or when
parcels can be disposed of without impairment of the public interest in what
remains). See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 484 U.S. 469, 475-76, 48283 (1988) (It has never been entirely clear whether Justice Field’s opinion was
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authorize small privatizations of trust resources where the bulk
46
of the trust resources remain public.
Many cases have adopted the Illinois Central exceptions. For
example, in Boone v. Kingsbury, the California Supreme Court
upheld the state’s issuance of oil drilling leases on trust lands,
concluding that the oil derricks would not substantially interfere
with the trust, especially in light of the state’s ability to remove
47
them upon a finding of substantial interference. The Wisconsin
Supreme Court upheld a conveyance of submerged Lake
Michigan land to a private company in City of Milwaukee v. State
because it was part and parcel of a larger scheme, entirely public
in nature, designed to enable the city to construct its outer harbor
48
in aid of navigation and commerce. Additionally, the Arkansas
Supreme Court, in State v. Southern Sand and Material Co.,
upheld the legislature’s authority to authorize the sale of sand
and gravel from navigable streambeds because it cannot be
claimed that the disposal or sale of sand and gravel is a
relinquishment of the state’s control over the common property,
or that it impairs the right of common enjoyment, or that it
49
interferes with navigation.
The lesson of the Illinois Central exceptions seems to be that
the public trust doctrine does not demand wholesale public
ownership of trust resources. So long as the public purposes
underlying the trust doctrine are maintained, small privatization
50
is permissible. In effect, the result is the public trust doctrine

grounded in state or federal law, although the Supreme Court has assumed it
was a state law interpretation, even though Field did not expressly rely on state
law). See Crystal S. Chase, The Illinois Central Public Trust Doctrine and
Federal Common Law: An Unconventional View, 16 HASTINGS W.-NW. J. ENVTL.
L. & POL’Y 113 (2010) (arguing that Illinois Central was based on federal
common law).
46. In this way the public trust doctrine is similar to the riparian water
rights doctrine, which allows small diversions so long as there is no substantial
interference with the rights of neighbors or the flow of the stream. See Carol M.
Rose, Joseph Sax and the Idea of the Public Trust, 25 ECOLOGY L.Q. 351, 360-61
(1989).
47. Boone v. Kingsbury, 273 P. 797 (Cal. 1928).
48. City of Milwaukee v. Wisconsin, 214 N.W.2d 820, 830 (Wis. 1923).
49. Arkansas v. S. Sand and Material Co., 167 S.W. 854, 856 (Ark. 1914).
50. See infra Part IV, discussing cases in which private parties could retain
ownership of trust lands if they maintained public water-related uses, as
specified in their land grants.
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prescribes a co-existence of public and private uses.
51
libertarian mind seems to have overlooked this reality.

The

IV. THE TRUST DOCTRINE’S TRANSFORMATION OF
FEE SIMPLES INTO DEFEASIBLE FEES
Where trust resources are privatized, trust obligations do not
necessarily disappear, as evident in the discussion of Marks v.
52
Whitney above. In both Massachusetts and Vermont, the courts
have interpreted the effect of the public trust on filled submerged
lands to transform the fee simple absolute of landowners into
defeasible fees. For example, in Boston Waterfront Development
Corp. v. Commonwealth, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial
Court ruled that the public interest in such formerly submerged
53
lands transcends the ordinary rules of property law.
Consequently, the court interpreted the nineteenth century
statutes authorizing fills in Boston Harbor for wharfing to grant
only fee simples subject to the condition subsequent that the
54
lands be used for the public purpose of maritime commerce.
Thus, the lands were subject to forfeiture if converted to private
55
condominiums.
Similarly, in Vermont v. Central Vermont Railway, the
Vermont Supreme Court ruled that the railroad’s attempted
conveyance of over a mile of Lake Champlain waterfront for real
56
estate development was a violation of the public trust doctrine.
As in Boston Harbor, the filled railroad-owned lands remained
burdened with the public trust, even though they were now
57
privately owned. Consequently, the court ruled that the state
had the duty to continuously supervise these shorelands to

51. See sources cited supra note 3.
52. See supra notes 36-39 and accompanying text.
53. Boston Waterfront Dev. Corp. v. Massachusetts, 393 N.E.2d 356, 367
(Mass. 1979).
54. Id. at 367.
55. Id. at 366.
56. Vermont v. Cent. Vt. Ry., 571 A.2d 1128 (Vt. 1989).
57. Id. at 1133-34 (deciding that 19th century wharfing statutes did not
contain a clear expression of an intent to abandon the public trust interest in
the lands covered by the wharves); see also City of Berkeley v. Sup. Ct., 606 P.2d
362 (Cal. 1980) (ruling that tidelands granted to private parties under an 1870
statute remained subject to public trust obligations).
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58

ensure that they were used for public purposes, and that the
railway owned the lands in fee simple subject to the condition
subsequent that the lands be used for railroad, wharf, or storage
59
purposes. Thus, the state had the right to reclaim title to the
lands if they were devoted to purposes inconsistent with the
60
public trust doctrine. These cases illustrate the transformative
nature of the public trust doctrine. They show that the doctrine
functions not to destroy private property but to modify it in order
to ensure that private uses conform to trust purposes.
V. THE TRUST DOCTRINE AS A PUBLIC EASEMENT
ON PRIVATE PROPERTY
More commonplace than transferring fee simples into
defeasible fees are court decisions that interpret the public trust
doctrine to impose a easement on fee simple estates. Perhaps the
most vivid example is the New Jersey Supreme Court’s
recognition in Matthews v. Bay Head that the doctrine burdened
61
The scope of this
private beaches with a public easement.
easement was not merely access to the ocean but also included
62
recreational rights to sunbathe on the beach.
But the New
Jersey court did not apply the public trust to all private beaches,
adopting an accommodation principle similar to that espoused by
the California Supreme Court’s Mono Lake decision that
accounted for the location of the beach, the extent and availability
of alternatives, the amount of public demand, and usage by the
63
64
landowner. Application of these Mathews factors led the New
58. Vermont, 571 A.2d at 1132 (citing Mono Lake, 658 P.2d at 712, 721).
59. Id. at 1135.
60. Id. (noting that “[t]his means that the State has the right of re-entry in
the event that the condition is breached by the railroad.”)
61. Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Ass’n, 471 A.2d 355 (N.J. 1984).
62. Id. at 365 (finding that “[t]he bather’s right in the upland sands is not
limited to passage. Reasonable enjoyment of the foreshore and the sea cannot be
realized unless some enjoyment of the dry sand is also allowed. The complete
pleasure of swimming must be accompanied by intermittent periods of rest and
relaxation beyond the water’s edge.”)
63. Id.
64. Referred to as a reasonableness test by the court. Nat’l Home Ass’n
Builders v. New Jersey Dep’t. of Envtl Prot., 64 F.Supp.2d 354, 359 (D. N.J.
1999) (holding that no taking resulted from a requirement that developers of
filled tidal lands provide a 30-foot walkway with public access, due to the
application of the public trust doctrine).
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Jersey Supreme Court to conclude in the 2005 case of Raleigh
Avenue Beach Ass’n v. Atlantis Beach Club that a private beach
had to be opened to the public at a reasonable fee, the amount to
65
be determined by the state. The Mathews beach access factors
provide a paradigmatic example of the accommodation principle
by allowing the courts to balance public access with private rights
66
to exclude.
A public easement to use beaches has also been the result of
the application of a doctrine closely related to the public trust:
67
customary rights. The pioneering case was the Oregon Supreme
Court’s 1969 decision in Thorton v. Hay, where the court ruled
that the public’s use of Oregon’s beaches was ancient enough and
prominent enough to establish a public easement quite similar to
that later recognized by the New Jersey Supreme Court under
68
the public trust doctrine.
Although the court later limited
public rights to access Oregon beaches to those that were

65. Raleigh Ave. Beach Ass’n v. Atlantis Beach Club, 879 A.2d 112, 124
(N.J. 2005).
66. As one commentator noted, the factors announced in Mathews
demonstrate how a court can balance the public right of access with private
property rights. See Mackenzie S. Keith, Judicial Protection for Beaches and
Parks: The Public Trust Above the High Water Mark, 16 HASTINGS W.-NW J.
ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 165, 179 n. 94 (2010). (“For example, where the upland beach
is removed from the ocean, other public beaches are nearby, public demand for
the upland beach is minimal, and the private landowner is making use of her
upland beach, the private landowner should be able to exclude the public.”)
67. The public trust and customary rights doctrines share a number of
characteristics. First, they both reward old uses. Second, they protect
established public uses. Third, they allow private uses that are consistent with
public uses. But customary rights require more demonstrable and uniform
historic public uses than the public trust doctrine requires. See Thorton v. Hay,
462 P.2d 671, 677 (Or. 1969) (recounting the Blackstonian elements of
customary rights).
68. Thorton, 462 P.2d at 677 (paraphrasing Blackstone as to the factors
relevant to a finding of customary rights, including the ancient nature of the
use; continuous use without interruption; peaceable use free from dispute;
reasonable use or use appropriate to the land and the community; visible
boundaries to provide certainty concerning the extent of the public easement;
obligatory, in the sense that the public use was not at landowners option; and
consistent with other customs and laws). See also State ex rel. Hannon v. Fox,
594 P.2d 1093, 1101 (Idaho 1979) (recognizing customary rights where all seven
of the Blackstonian elements were met).
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69

adjacent to the ocean, the doctrine of custom was resoundingly
70
reaffirmed in Stevens v. City of Cannon Beach.
Several other
state courts have adopted the customary rights doctrine as a
71
vehicle for recognizing a public easement in ocean beaches.
The states recognizing a public trust or customary rights
easement for beach access have in effect moved the lineal
delineation of public rights upland, away from the traditional
boundary at the water’s edge. They have been joined by other
72
states which have applied the public trust doctrine to parklands.
The frontiers of the public trust doctrine no doubt lie in such
upland resources with great public value. This amphibious
evolution is only a continuation of the doctrine’s historical
73
advance from tidal to inland navigable waters.
VI. CONCLUSION
The accommodation principle that the Mono Lake court and
subsequent cases have implemented has become the chief

69. MacDonald v. Halverson, 780 P.2d 714, 724 (Or. 1989) (determining that
a beach at a freshwater pool separated from the ocean, which the public did not
historically use, was not subject to public customary rights).
70. Stevens v. City of Cannon Beach, 854 P.2d 449, 456 (Or. 1993)
(concluding that the Oregon doctrine of customary rights was a background
principle under the Lucas framework). Justice Scalia, joined by Justice
O’Connor, dissented from the Supreme Court’s denial of certiorari,
acknowledging the difficulty in reviewing a takings claim without developed
facts in the courts below but arguing that the Court should hear the petitioner’s
due process claim that the Oregon customary rights doctrine was pretextual or a
historical), cert. denied 510 U.S. 1207, 1209 (1994).
71. See, e.g. Public Access Shoreline Hawaii by Rothstein v. Hawai’i County
Planning Comm’n by Fujimoto, 903 P.2d 1246, 1263 (Haw. 1995); Matcha v.
Mattox, 711 S.W.2d 95 (Tex. Civ. App. 1986); City of Daytona Beach v. TonaRama, Inc., 294 So.2d 73 (Fla. 1974). See generally JON W. BRUCE & JAMES W.
ELY, JR., THE LAW OF EASEMENTS AND LICENSES IN LAND §§ 5.26, 6.2, 6.3 (2001)
(collecting articles on beach access). Texas beach access was strengthened in
2009, when the voters overwhelmingly approved Proposition 9, an amendment
to the Texas Constitution which, inter alia, declared that “[t]he public,
individually and collectively, has an unrestricted right to use and a right of
ingress to and egress from a public beach. The right granted by this subsection
is dedicated as a permanent easement in favor of the public.” See Tx. H.R.J. Res.
102 (2009) (approved Nov. 3, 2009, amending TX CONST. Art. 1), available at
http://ballotpedia.org/wiki /index.php/Texas_Proposition_9_(2009).
72. See supra note 34; Keith, supra note 66, at 179-87 (collecting cases).
73. See Scott Reed, The Public Trust Doctrine: Is It Amphibious?, 1 J.
ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 107 (1986).
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characteristic of the public trust doctrine’s effect on private
property. By imposing on the state a continuous supervisory duty
74
to attempt to preserve trust assets Mono Lake ruled that 1)
75
there were no vested private rights that limited the trust, 2)
private grantees use rights were limited by the trust
76
responsibility, and 3) the state was not confined to erroneous
77
All of these interpretations were means to
past decisions.
implement the feasible accommodation for which the court called.
This accommodation meant that there would be a balancing of
78
public and private rights in fulfilling the trust responsibility,
which is hardly an evisceration of private property, unless private
property means a kind of private sovereignty immune from state
control. That sort of private property exists only in libertarian
dreamworld.
This review of representative public trust case law reveals
the doctrine to be not so much an anti-privatization concept as a
vehicle for mediating between public and private rights in
important natural resources. Courts have accomplished this
accommodation of public and private rights sometimes through a
geographical division, sometimes through a conceptional division,
sometimes through allowing small privatizations of public
resources, sometimes through a transformation of the definition
of the private property interest, and sometimes through
recognition of a public easement on private property. In none of
74. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
75. Mono Lake, 658 P.2d at 712, 721, 727 (trust doctrine bars any claim of a
vested right to harm trust resources).
76. Id. at 722-23 (citing People v. Cal. Fish Co., 138 P. 79 (Cal. 1913));
Berkeley v. Sup. Ct., 606 P.2d 362 (Cal. 1980). See also Mono Lake, 658 P.2d at
724 (“[n]o one could contend that the state could grant tidelands free of the trust
merely because the grant served some public purpose.”)
77. Mono Lake, 658 P.2d at 723, 728 (trust doctrine gives the state the
continuing power to revok[e] previously granted rights and enforce “the trust
against lands long thought free of the trust . . . the state is not confined by past
allocation decisions which may be incorrect in light of current knowledge or
inconsistent with current needs.”)
78. Id. This balancing was especially evident in the court’s discussion of
water rights, where the economy of the state was built in large part on water
diverted from streams, it would be disingenuous to hold all such diversions were
improper, that as a matter of practical necessity the state may have to approve
appropriations despite foreseeable harm to public trust uses, but the state had
to take the public trust into account to the extent feasible and preserve, so far as
consistent with the public interest, the uses protected by the public trust.
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these cases have the courts eliminated private property, but they
have employed the public trust doctrine to recognize public rights
in private property.
Recognition of the nature of the
accommodation between public and private rights that is
accomplished by application of the public trust doctrine will no
doubt not assuage its libertarian critics, but it might lead to more
constructive conversations about the nature of public rights in
79
privately owned land.

79. See, e.g., FREYFOGEL, ON PRIVATE PROPERTY, supra note 11, at 15-20
(correcting the “half-truth” that private property is primarily an individual
right, the keystone of all other rights), 131-56 (discussing “the responsible
landowner,” including trust responsibilities, managing interconnected resources,
the evolving nature of property rights, and supplying a suggested landowner’s
bill of rights); FREYFOGEL, THE LAND WE SHARE, supra note 11, at 101-34
(discussing various justifications for private property and showing how property
rights and responsibilities have evolved over time). See also Alexandra B. Klass,
Modern Public Trust Principles: Recognizing Rights and Integrating Standards,
82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 699 (2006) (discussing the modern public trust doctrine,
which is not only based on its traditional common law origins but also statutory
and constitutional trust provisions).
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